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INTRODUCTION 
Should law schools require a course in judicial biography? Should 
boards of bar examiners quiz applicants about the politics of the judges 
sitting in the jurisdictions to which they seek admission? If political 
scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth had their way, these practices 
and lnore might well become part oflawyers' basic training.1 At least, 
that is the implication of their "attitudinal model," which they bill as 
scientific proof that the Supreme Court decides cases not on the basis of 
doctrine and the rules tested on bar exams, but instead on the basis of 
the individual Justice~' political and ideological attitudes about the issues 
in litigation or the litigants before them or both.2 Segal and Spaeth 
further assert that these attitudes are susceptible to principled discern-
ment and measure, indexed by variables ranging from the political party 
of the appointing president to the nature of the Justice's pre-appointment 
professional experience. They gather and manipulate such data to form 
a model for "predicting" judicial decisions----that activity of predicting 
"and nothing more pretentious, being what [Oliver Wendell Holmes] 
mean[t] by the law."3 
To be sure, Critical Legal Studies scholars, who have asserted that 
even the nature of a judge's lunch or night's sleep factors into the result 
in a particular case, would hardly blink at the canonization of attitudinal 
studies. Nor should experienced practitioners wince, for they have long 
sought to instill in young litigators the importance of researching the 
judge or panel to whom briefs are to be submitted. Indeed, the 
intangibles that Segal and Spaeth compile under the rubric "attitude" are 
not very different from what the law traditionally has called "judicial 
discretion." 
l. Judicial biography is hardly a nascent or neglected topic among legal scholars. 
An excellent collection of essays by scholars, including Richard A. Posner and Thomas 
C. Grey, as well as an outstanding bibliography, were recently gathered for a symposium 
at New York University. See Symposium: National Conference on Judicial Biography, 
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 485 (I 995). 
2. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 
(l 897). 
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Even if judicial biography does not become a required subject, the 
success rate of Segal and Spaeth's model4 makes it an important 
contribution to the study of judicial process. To date they have focused 
their model only on Supreme Court decisions; the resulting void serves 
as an invitation to additional work, to which this Article is a response. 
This Article reports on the performance of a study based on and 
inspired by Segal and Spaeth's work. It examines the possible 
attitudinal bases of the entire corpus ( over 100 cases) of federal district 
court decisions involving constitutional self-representation claims. As 
explained in greater detail below, this area of jurisprudence was selected 
for study because decisions often are dependent upon the exercise of 
judicial discretion-Segal and Spaeth's attitudinal factors. This study 
both elucidates the attitudinal methods of Segal and Spaeth and "proves" 
an exception to the attitudinal model hypothesized by Segal and Spaeth. 
That exception is the salience of doctrine in the decisions of lower 
federal court judges who, unlike Supreme Court Justices, adjudicate 
cognizant of appellate reviewability. 
This Article first provides a brief elaboration of Segal and Spaeth's 
project and rebuts its principal critics.5 Next, it reviews the relevant 
features of self-representation jurisprudence. Then it details the study 
performed on that body of cases, including explanations of the sample 
and methodology, and concludes with a discussion and analysis of the 
results. 
I. SEGAL AND SPAETH'S ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
Segal and Spaeth have advanced the attitudinal model as a principled 
basis for explaining the way judges decide cases and for predicting 
decisions in future cases. In their universe, the attitudinal model is in 
counterpoise to a collection of analytical principles they term the "legal 
4. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 208-60. 
5. Segal and Spaeth describe and respond to their principal critics. See id. at 356-
63. Bradley Canon articulates additional criticisms in his review of the book, 3 LA w & 
POL. BOOK REV. 98-100, Sept. 1993, available in the World Wide Web at go-
pher:\\nuinfo.nwu.edu\l 1\library\joumal (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n), to which Timothy Hagle 
has replied in full. Timothy Hagle, A Reply to Professor Canon 's Review of Segal and 
Spaeth 's The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 3 LAW & POL. BOOK REV., Oct. 
1993, available in the World Wide Web at gopher:\\nuinfo.nwu.edu\11\library\joumal 
(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n). For a favorable review, see Melinda Gann Hall, 57 J. OF POL. 
254 ( l 995) (book review). 
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model."6 The legal model, for Segal and Spaeth, holds that legal rules 
and principles----what lawyers call doctrine----are what decide cases. The 
attitudinal model, by contrast, is built on assertions such as "Rehnquist 
votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative" and 
"Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal."7 
What has sparked controversy is that to each of these rather umemark-
able assertions, Segal and Spaeth affix their signature coda:" ... and for 
no other reason."8 
Critics from the legal academy have generated some fairly passionate 
charges against Segal and Spaeth and their political science comrades. 
The critics fault Segal and Spaeth for not being clear about how much 
room the legal model officially allocates to the intangibles that easily 
appear to be non-doctrinal features of the decision maker's attitude. 
Scholars are left uncertain over which of their comments about judicial 
decision-making belong in what model. Ultimately, the critiques echo 
the debates occurring within the legal community itself about how judges 
reach their decisions and the latent tension between "macro" and "micro" 
justice that has long permeated the legal discourse. 
The reference to Holmes is hardly a mere ploy to forge legitimacy in 
legal circles: Segal and Spaeth cite Holmes as authority for their 
enterprise. They position their task squarely within Holmes' infamous 
articulation of"what [he] mean[s] by the law," namely, "[t]he prophecies 
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious."9 
More critically, they derive the title of their supposedly innovative, 
insurgent manifesto from the respected jurist's own words. Warning 
against the fallacy of assuming that reason and logic were the only bases 
of judicial decisions, Holmes explained that: 
[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose 
which is in every hwnan mind. But . . . [b ]eh ind the logical form lies a 
judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative 
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the 
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. . . . You always can imply a 
condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief 
... or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable 
of exact quantitative measurement .... 10 
6. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 33-52. 
7. Id. at 65. 
8. Segal and Spaeth acknowledge that their way of looking at legal decisions 
derives from the legal realists of the 1920s, such as Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, 
id. at 65, but they go further by declaring the legal model to be meaningless. Id. at 62-
64. 
9. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461. 
10. Id. at 466 ( emphasis added). 
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That Holmes justifies formal attention to the attitude of the decision 
maker-be it the social, political, moral, ethical, or ideological values of 
the judge---<:annot be denied. That Holmes fully supports the Segal and 
Spaeth project, however, is less certain. First, Segal and Spaeth dismiss 
the legal model in its entirety: They expressly call it "meaningless,"11 
which is an unpalatable affront to legal academics, most of whom spend 
a considerable part of their professional lives teaching legal doctrine in 
the law schools. Nor is their uncompromising position the necessary 
implication of Holmes' quoted admonition; for Holmes himself certainly 
devoted a great deal of his life to applying legal doctrine. Perhaps Segal 
and Spaeth, like Holmes, saw themselves as having no choice but to 
overstate, as if to compensate for a perceived shortcoming in the 
common wisdom. 
Second, as social scientists and statisticians, Segal and Spaeth have 
taken the additional step of quantifying the attitudinal components of 
judicial decisions that Holmes believed were not capable of such exact 
measurement. 12 Through the lens of their statistical methods, the legal 
model cannot help but appear inadequate. Indeed, Segal and Spaeth 
expressly equate the legal model's supposed failings with their inability 
to document and measure it: The only acts that in their world count as 
proof that a model operates. Further, Segal and Spaeth assemble the 
many flagrant contradictions in Supreme Court judicial decision-making 
methodology that might make the Court look bad to laymen insistent on 
rigid consistency, juxtaposing instances of apparently absurd, result-
oriented adherence to precedent13 with equally agenda-driven departure 
from precedent. 14 Such examples are virtually irrefutable proof that 
11. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 62. 
12. See Holmes, supra note 3, at 466. 
13. For example, in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972), Justice Blackmun 
upheld major league baseball's exemption from the antitrust statutes, conceding that 
"others might regard this as 'unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,"' but explaining that 
"the aberration is an established one ... entitled to the benefit of stare decisis." Id. 
( citation omitted). 
14. For example, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), Chief Justice 
Rehnquist expressly overturns earlier holdings in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 
(1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), when holding that the 
Eighth Amendment does not bar the admission of victim impact evidence during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial. In that decision, stare decisis is described as "the 
preferred course .. .'in most matters' ... [but] not an inexorable command." Payne, 50 I 
U.S. at 827-28 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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doctrine alone does not decide, or enable one to predict the outcome of, 
individual cases (unless of course the concept of doctrine is so malleable 
and flexible that it approaches meaninglessness). 
For this reason Segal and Spaeth's work has been subject to many 
criticisms,15 but many of those accusations reflect a misunderstanding 
of their assertions and their entire project. Segal and Spaeth 's claimed 
success rate makes their contribution to our understanding of how justice 
happens worth examining. Even if it goes too far, Segal and Spaeth's 
work is an important new beginning in the study of judicial decision 
making; it does not deserve the most bitter of the reproaches it has 
received. 16 
One might even argue that their announcement is not news at all. 
Over a century after Holmes, the Justices continue to acknowledge the 
nondoctrinal bases for their decisions. A poignant example is Justice 
Blackmun's opinion in a recent abortion decision, written in response to 
both the plurality opinion and the separate opinions of conservatives 
Rehnquist and Scalia: 
In one sense, the (plurality's] approach is worlds apart from that of THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA. And yet, in another sense, the distance 
between the two is short--the distance is but a single vote. 
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step 
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue 
before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the 
two worlds will be made. 17 
Notwithstanding that legal scholars would not employ the term 
"model" in the wooden way of strict social scientists, the comments of 
Holmes and Blackmun indicate that an attitudinal component is and has 
always been part of anything that might be delineated as a legal model, 
"model" being understood as a comprehensive schema for predicting 
judicial decisions. (By the same token, Segal and Spaeth ought to have 
extended the same latitude to law that they seek for themselves; they 
emphasize that it is a model they are expounding, which unlike a 
formula, is not compelled to be accurate 100 percent of the time). 
15. See supra note 5. 
16. Nor should Segal and Spaeth's view be understood as reducing the value of 
the study of law and the use of legal doctrine in written and oral advocacy, which 
consumes a great deal of lawyers' and judges' professional time. They point out merely 
that there seems to be no principled way to predict results on the basis of doctrine 
alone------news that attorneys frequently share with clients. 
17. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J ., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part). 
706 
[VOL. 33: 701, 1996) "Attitudinal" Decision Making 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
What has been a trigger of heated reactions more subtle than Segal 
and Spaeth's assumptions that the legal rule is not based on doctrine is 
the perceived brazenness of their efforts to document that indeterminacy. 
They not only register their agreement with Blackmun's and Holmes' 
impressions, but also undertake to prove them statistically. Lawyers and 
judges, however, generally prefer to avoid attempts at pinning down the 
method of what they do and probably distrust formulaic efforts to predict 
judicial decisions as the unattainable goal of statistics-crazed social 
scientists. Segal and Spaeth put legal purists on the defensive by 
encroaching on sacred territory, lifting the shroud of mystery and respect 
supposedly encircling the judicial process. Notwithstanding that many 
candidly would acknowledge that the shroud is virtually transparent 
today, Segal and Spaeth's work, like Dorothy's venture into the Wizard's 
control room, seems, to many, too great an intrusion. 
Segal and Spaeth are not the first analysts to have undertaken such 
sacrilegious inquiry. For example, H. W. Perry won scholarly acclaim 
for publishing interviews of several Supreme Court Justices and their 
clerks, anonymity preserved, to demonstrate the countless nondoctrinal 
bases for the Court's decisions on certiorari petitions. 18 Unlike Perry's 
work, however, Segal and Spaeth's is not principally an expose, but 
instead an attempt to document, if possible, what lawyers already know 
when they refer to a judge as being a light sentencer, sympathetic to 
business, or unsympathetic to discrimination claims. 
Still, the documentation itself troubles many because, at bottom, it 
incorporates assumptions that go to the core of unanswered questions 
about human nature. Most critically, the manner in which Segal and 
Spaeth proceed to measure attitudes ultimately relies on, or appears to 
prove, assertions about human nature that many may find objectionable. 
To illustrate, Segal and Spaeth's archetypal statement is that when a case 
comes before a particular judge, her decision is largely the result of her 
attitudes, such as political views or moral values. This statement implies 
either ( 1) that the judge consciously disregards or molds doctrine to suit 
her agenda, or (2) if the attitudinal influence is not conscious, that the 
judge's decision is the product of attitudes that themselves are the 
product of her lifetime of experiences, social background, and political 
affiliations, making the judge herself unconscious of whence her own 
18. H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991). 
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attitudes derive and rendering her all but unable to prevent their 
influence. The first implication suggests corruption or abdication of the 
judicial obligation to impartiality, while the latter suggests an even more 
frightening notion--a version of the essentialist credo that human 
behavior is rigidly determined and that the rule of law is not so much 
indeterminate as it is predetermined, at least once the judicial appoint-
ment or case assignment occurs. 
Lastly, Segal and Spaeth sorely test the American legal system's 
historic distrust of statistics. Courts have long remarked on their lack of 
probative value, reasoning that statistics are not proof in the individual 
case. 19 Vigorous debate on this issue occurs in any kind of discrimina-
tion case, where statistics of incidence prove overwhelming discriminato-
ry impact, but are held not to be sufficient proof of internal discrimina-
tion in the particular case.20 An objection to this view is that strong 
statistical correlations, when controlling for other factors, might well be 
a reasonable basis for inference, an activity in which the law engages all 
the time. For example, first-year law students are taught that the 
impossibility of ever taking a picture of the brain to produce the direct 
evidence of criminal intent creates an indispensable place for inference 
in criminal law. The difference, however, is that when mens rea is 
inferred, the inference is based on evidence particular to the individual 
defendant. 
The law has long struggled with this tension between individual-case 
justice and bright-line predetermined rules. For example, in death 
penalty jurisprudence, this friction was the problem so troubling to 
Justice Douglas in Furman v. Georgia21 and most articulately described 
19. E.g., United States v. Banlcs, 36 M.J. 150, 176 n.6 (C.M.A. 1992) (Cox, J., 
dissenting). Judge Cox explains: 
Assume it can be shown that the only recurrent identifiers of child sexual 
abusers are red hair, blue eyes, and left-handedness. Assume also that, in 
50% of the cases in which child abuse has actually occurred, the abuser bore 
these features. Assume further that 50% of all people having these three 
characteristics are actual child abusers, but that the other 50% are not. What 
does it prove if the accused has red hair, blue eyes, and is left-handed? Is the 
accused more likely or less likely to have abused a given child? Obviously we 
do not know, for the characteristics do not help us decide into which subset 
of red haired, blue eyed, left-handed people the accused [falls]. Even if the 
abuse figures ran as high as 90%, they would still not shed any light on 
whether the accused was in the 90% group or the 10% group. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
20. An extreme example is the Supreme Court's rejection of the statistical proof 
that black defendants were much more likely to receive the death penalty than whites, 
insisting that discriminatory intent in a particular imposition of the penalty be shown. 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (I 987). 
21. 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972)(Douglas, J., concurring). 
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by Justice B!ackmun in his last death penalty opinion.22 They under-
stood that the more individualized the process of death penalty 
sentencing is, the more arbitrary it becomes. On the other hand, an 
element of arbitrariness exists in bright-line, system-wide rules, for the 
need to simplify a complex area of the law with a bright-line rule will 
require some arbitrary determination of where the line is. The same 
conflict is manifest in the enactment of, and fierce resistance to, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.23 
In the end, fairness must be accepted as having dual but often 
competing constituents: The individual who wants custom, case-by-case 
adjudication, tailored to account for the idiosyncracies of his particular 
circumstances, and the system, which must treat similarly situated people 
alike if it is to earn the respect necessary for its authority. Segal and 
Spaeth could not help but provoke the ire of some faction of the legal 
academy since their work straddles this tension between "macro" and 
"micro" justice. 
22. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994)(mem.). Justice Blackmun dissented 
from the denial of certiorari in this case, arguing that the death penalty cannot be 
administered in accordance with the constitutional requirements of consistency of 
application and individualized sentencing. Id. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
Blackmun explained: 
To be fair, a capital sentencing scheme must treat each person convicted of a 
capital offense with that "degree of respect due the uniqueness of the 
individual." That means affording the sentencer the power and discretion to 
grant mercy in a particular case, and providing avenues for the consideration 
of any and all relevant mitigating evidence that would justify a sentence less 
than death. Reasonable consistency, on the other hand, requires that the death 
penalty be inflicted evenhandedly, in accordance with reason and objective 
standards .... 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
23. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 
217(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 3017-34 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)) 
established the United States Sentencing Commission to issue the sentencing guidelines, 
now compiled as UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1995). For a defense of the drafters' handling of the competing 
demands of the "charge offense" system (which blindly sentences strictly according to 
the offense as charged, without regard to aggravating or mitigating concerns) and the 
more subjective "real offense" approach, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 
8-12 (1988). For an articulate criticism of the guidelines' removal of individualized 
sentencing, see, e.g., David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real-Offense 
Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing G11ide/ines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403 (1993) and 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988). 
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Discerning Segal and Spaeth's position in this dialectic is essential for 
understanding their work. It can hardly be questioned that they are 
predominantly concerned with systemic fairness, macro-justice, and 
consistency across cases or across judges. From this viewpoint, the legal 
model's inadequacies are too much in the foreground. Despite 
Blackmun's description of the two kinds of fairness which any rule of 
justice ought to achieve,24 the American legal model has tended to tip 
in favor of justice in the individual case at the expense of systemic 
fairness. 
The preference for individual justice is reflected in the widespread and 
intense criticism of the injustice the sentencing guidelines caused (which 
seems greater than the displeasure with the injustice they sought to 
remedy), in the unavailability of a "selective prosecution" defense, in the 
relatively greater viscosity of substantive due process as opposed to 
equal protection as a guarantor of liberties, and in the deep-rooted 
American celebration of individualism. Forced to choose between the 
two, most Americans would pick the fuzzier rule that at least gave them 
an opportunity to argue their case over one that treated them with less-
absolute individuality, but relatively the same as their cellmate. So the 
legal model Segal and Spaeth reject is the one that would listen to the 
"special circumstances" argument of a death penalty defendant, or would 
allow "downward departure" under the sentencing guidelines. Segal and 
Spaeth 's rejection of that model reflects dispassionate and unmitigated 
preference for the needs of the system25 and the view that accommodat-
ing the individual is a departure from principle. At the end of the day, 
Segal and Spaeth make no assertions about the fairness or correctness in 
an ontological, metaphysical, or absolute sense of the particular judicial 
decisions they study. As social scientists, their principal concern is with 
measurability; legal doctrine, however, like much of human activity, was 
not designed to accommodate statistical measurement concerns. Segal 
and Spaeth's work and the body of criticisms it engendered should be 
understood in this light. 
24. See supra note 22. 
25. However, all efforts to protect the system naturally have an indirect benefit on 
those individuals that particular system affects. 
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II. APPLYING SEGAL AND SPAETH TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 
DECISIONS 
A. Overview of the Project 
Two aspects of Segal and Spaeth's work kindled the study which is 
the subject of this Article. First, they have subjected to their dispassion-
ate measuring scales a strikingly wide range of facts about the human 
beings who become judges. Predictors of judicial decisions that they or 
fellow scholars have assessed include, among others, the political party 
of the appointing president (as a rough gauge of political attitude), 
schooling, geographic origin, rank among siblings, and previous work 
experience (and other psychological and social determinants that in tum 
influence a judge's vote in a particular case).26 
This project examined a comparably eclectic though smaller group of 
factors. In place of Segal and Spaeth's tenn-"attitudinal"--this study 
adopted the more inclusive label "extra-legal model" (ELM) for that host 
of nondoctrinal factors that Segal and Spaeth and other political 
scientists formally have considered as the systematic basis for explaining 
and predicting judicial decisions. 
26. See, e.g., Peter F. Nardulli et al., Unraveling the Complexities of Decision 
Making in Face-to Face Groups: A Contextual Analysis of Plea-Bargained Sentences, 
78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 912 (1984) (assessing interpersonal skills); James L. Gibson, 
Personality and Elite Political Behavior: The Influence of Self Esteem on Judicial 
Decision Making, 43 J. POL. 104 (1981); James L. Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations, 
Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 91 I (1978) 
(study of Iowa state court trial judges focusing on how judges perceive themselves as 
individuals and as judicial officers); S. Sidney Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator 
to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 622 (1973) [hereinafter Ulmer, Social Background] (considering nine 
different factors, and finding correlations between Justices' votes and their age at 
appointment, federal administrative experience and religious affiliation). But see James 
L. Payne & James A. Dyer, Betting After the Race is Over: The Perils of Post Hoc 
Hypothesizing, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 559 (1975) (criticizing Ulmer's method ofobtaining 
data). Payne & Dyer's criticism was rebutted in S. Sidney Ulmer, H0 : Post Hoc Con -
Straw-Man Con = 0, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 565 (1975). See also C. Neal Tate & Roger 
Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme 
Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460 (199l)(studying possible 
correlations between votes and, inter alia, urban/agrarian roots, order of birth among 
siblings, father's governmental experience, party of appointing president, and 
southernness); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 221-234, 241-255 (reviewing 
additional literature). 
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Second, Segal and Spaeth's focus on the Supreme Court invites further 
study of other courts. They theorize that their model probably would not 
predict lower federal court decisions because lower court judges, aware 
that they are subject to review by a superior court, presumably do not 
like to be reversed. Therefore those judges are more compliance-minded, 
or respectful of precedent, and are thus less likely to decide cases on 
grounds other than doctrine, such as policy preferences or other ELM 
factors.27 Segal and Spaeth, however, do not empirically test their 
assertion about lower courts, and few others have focused on non-
Supreme Court cases.28 
This study aims to begin filling that void. Deriving from Segal and 
Spaeth's facially sensible observation, this project examines the extent 
to which factors other than doctrine influence the behavior of lower 
court judges. If Segal and Spaeth's generalization about lower court 
judges' compliance-mindedness holds, then it is reasonable to expect that 
federal district court judges would be relatively more compliance-minded 
than federal circuit court judges. The extremely small percentage of 
certiorari petitions the Supreme Court grants,29 among other things, 
makes a circuit court decision much less likely to be reviewed than a 
district court decision, many of which are appealable as of right.30 
In its most reductionist terms, Segal and Spaeth's model amounts to 
proof that Supreme Court Justices, like baseball umpires and others 
authorized to make crucial decisions, are human beings and not robots. 
Lower court judges are no less human beings than Supreme Court 
Justices. Therefore, notwithstanding Segal and Spaeth's expectation that 
lower court judges are respectful of legal doctrine, it is not unreasonable 
to expect to find some evidence of the role of attitudinal and ELM 
factors, especially in light of the strength of the evidence of the 
influence of ELM factors at the Supreme Court level. 31 If this study 
27. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 69-72. They do cite one study of appellate 
court decisions that reportedly shows "little overtly noncompliant behavior." Id. at 71-72, 
72 n.153. 
28. E.g., Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in 
State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54 (1990); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975). See also C.K. 
Rowland et al., Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal 
Courts: the Reagan Judges, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 411 (Sheldon Goldman & 
Austin Sarat eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
29. Although statistics vary, it is accepted that the Court grants review to no more 
than I 0% of the paid petitions and I% of the unpaid petitions. See generally SEGAL & 
SPAETH, supra note 2, at 165-206; PERRY, supra note 18. 
30. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4. 
31. Segal and Spaeth claim a 74% accuracy rate in predicting Supreme Court 
decisions in search and seizure cases. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 230. 
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had been intended, however, as a direct test of the legal model-it is 
not,32 but the converse hypothesis is inevitably implicated----then 
assuming arguendo the correctness of Segal and Spaeth's suggestions 
about lower court behavior, it would be reasonable to expect little 
correlation between various ELM factors and the decisions in particular 
cases. 
The hypotheses selected for testing are derivative of the 
attitudinal model and of several other studies of ELM factors. Specifi-
cally examined were whether certain (I) social background and ideology 
factors, and (2) factual "cues"33 show any significant correlation with 
the decisions of judges in a particular sample of cases. The chosen body 
of cases contained decisions of judges in a fairly unique position, 
namely, those in which a federal district court judge is asked to rule on 
a criminal defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.34 On the 
lowest rung in the federal judicial hierarchy, they earn the presumption 
of greatest compliance-mindedness. Habeas procedural requirements, 
however, place the district judge, while sitting as a trial judge in a court 
of original jurisdiction, into an appellate review posture. Specifically, 
because the habeas petitioner must have exhausted his appeals in the 
state system, the federal district judge's job is to review the correctness 
of state court decisions on constitutional issues in light of the already 
existing state trial record. 
Further, assuming that any influence of ELM factors might be 
measured, it seemed most likely that such influence would be detectable 
in cases where the exercise of judicial discretion could reasonably be 
32. Again, the legal model does not lend itself to the kind of statistical measuring 
Segal and Spaeth employed and that is being roughly followed here. 
33. Although the study of the relation between facts in the case and the decisions 
could be labeled "fact pattern analysis" like the kind employed by Segal and Spaeth in 
their study of search and seizure cases, SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 208-221, what 
I examine, while technically "facts" in the cases, may more sensibly be understood as 
"cues" as that term was developed by Joseph Tanenhaus, et al. in The Supreme Court's 
Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS, supra note 28, at 
158. 
34. The habeas statute authorizes a defendant who claims he is being confined in 
violation of the United States Constitution to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the federal district court in which his conviction was obtained or in which he is 
incarcerated. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). Courts have developed an important additional 
requirement, known as "exhaustion," which requires that in order to be heard in federal 
court a habeas petitioner must first have exhausted his appeals in state court and have 
raised in those appeals the same constitutional issue raised in the habeas petition. 
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anticipated. Cases involving an accused's constitutional right to self-
representation were chosen. That right, first announced by the Supreme 
Court in 1975 in Faretta v. California,35 is now among the bundle of 
constitutional claims a defendant may raise on habeas. The exercise of 
judicial discretion seems particularly invited, not because any prong of 
the doctrine expressly so provides, but instead because the doctrine, 
neutrally construed, would lead to results unpalatable to many: Among 
others, a defendant who was represented by counsel could seek to 
overturn his conviction on the ground that he was denied the right to 
represent himself, and a defendant who was permitted, at his request, to 
represent himself at trial might later argue that he was erroneously 
permitted to do so.36 Either scenario would appear to test seriously 
one's loyalty to the constitutional guarantee. 
A closer examination of the Faretta doctrine is essential to appreciate 
the issues in the cases studied. 
B. Background on Faretta 
On June 30, 1975, Justice Stewart issued the decision for a 6-3 
majority of the United States Supreme Court in Faretta, announcing a 
new federal constitutional37 right for defendants in state criminal trials. 
Under Faretta, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees a defendant in state criminal proceedings the right to 
represent himself at trial-technically, the right to waive the Sixth 
Amendment's express guarantee of assistance of counsel. By any 
measure, Faretta makes a trial judge's job difficult: Not only must the 
judge see that the defendant receives the guaranteed right to counsel, but 
the judge must also ensure that, in the process, a lawyer is not unconsti-
tutionally forced upon the defendant. Under Faretta, once a defendant 
articulates a desire to proceed pro se, the trial judge must conduct an 
inquiry to determine whether the defendant's request is genuine-not 
simply a ploy to delay the proceedings or to fabricate an issue for 
appeal--and whether the defendant is making a knowing and voluntary 
waiver38 of the right to counsel. 
35. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
36. See additional discussion infra text accompanying note 42. 
37. At the time of the Faretta decision the constitutions of 36 states explicitly 
recognized the right to self-repr-~sentation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 813-14, n.10 
(cataloguing provisions). In the federal courts the right to self-representation has existed 
by statute since 1789. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, I Stat. 73, 92 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1875)). 
38. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (articulating standard for assessing 
waivers of constitutional rights). 
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Under Faretta, the defendant's lack of legal trammg or the trial 
judge's belief that the defendant would likely fare better with an attorney 
are impermissible grounds for the judge's denial of a request to proceed 
pro se. Faretta explains that the right is about autonomy and self-
determination, not mere procedure or the accuracy of the trial out-
come--the values protected by many other constitutional rights of 
criminal litigants. In short, Faretta protects a defendant's right "to go 
to jail under his own banner if he so desires."39 Understandably, 
however, many regard Faretta as constitutionalizing the right to be 
eccentric, stupid, idiosyncratic, or disruptive.40 
Three additional aspects of Faretta jurisprudence make decisions 
involving Faretta-based claims particularly suitable for this kind of 
study. First, the Supreme Court has held that Faretta claims are not 
subject to harmless error analysis,41 a view that probably reflects the 
fact that Faretta does not necessarily promote the accuracy of the 
trial--the defendant is arguably almost always better off with a 
competent attorney who knows pretrial procedures, the judicial system, 
and the mechanics of trial practice. Thus, if a reviewing court finds that 
a well-meaning trial judge forced counsel on a defendant because the 
judge believed doing so was in the defendant's best interest, under 
Faretta that conviction must be overturned.42 The federal district court 
judge adjudicating a habeas petition cannot take the easy way out by 
finding a violation but nonetheless upholding the conviction in light of 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
Second, Faretta appears to open the door to abuse: All a defendant 
has to do is ask to represent himself, and he at least sets up a possible 
claim on appeal. Faretta holds that a defendant who does represent 
39. United States ex. rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966). 
40. The Faretta decision spawned a large body of scholarly discussion in the years 
immediately following its issuance. Many of these articles include incisive analyses of 
Justice Stewart's reasoning and perceptive appraisals of the doctrine in application. See, 
e.g., Frank A. Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation and the Power of Jury 
Nullification, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 269 (1978)(discussing the impact of Fare/ta 
upon trial practice); Howard J. Schwab, How Far Faretta: Creating Implied Constitu-
tional Rights, 6 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. I (1977). 
41. E.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 165, 177 n.8 (1984); Johnstone v. Kelly, 
808 F.2d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987). The "harmless 
error" doctrine originated in Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967). 
42. Johnstone, 808 F.2d at 218 (cataloguing cases from other circuits). 
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himself may not thereafter be heard to complain that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, many who have represented 
themselves after invoking Faretta have argued on appeal that their 
waiver was not knowing and voluntary and that, for one reason or 
another, they felt they had no choice but to represent themselves.43 
Again, knowing what is the correct thing to do when a criminal 
defendant invokes the right to represent himself seems very difficult for 
a state trial judge, who must seek to administer justice in the face of an 
increasingly heavy docket while simultaneously striving to shelter validly 
obtained convictions from needless appeal--the same event could now 
set up two arguments on appeal-and safeguarding the liberty that the 
Court in Faretta says the Constitution protects.44 Since they are trial 
judges themselves, federal district judges adjudicating habeas petitions 
naturally would be sensitive to these challenges when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a state trial judge's response to Faretta's dictates. 
Third, the Supreme Court has not addressed the Faretta right since 
Stewart discovered it in 1975. This means that to know the Faretta 
decision is, for the most part, to know the Faretta doctrine. Although 
intermediate federal courts have added their interpretations to Faretta 
jurisprudence, Faretta remains unlike most of the other constitutional 
rights of the accused recognized by the Warren Court in that there is no 
significant doctrinal development or evolution subsequent to the initial 
decision (as there is, for example, in search and seizure, self-incrimina-
tion, and effective assistance of counsel law). In short, discerning the 
Faretta rule of law does not especially burden federal judges or their 
clerks. Therefore, when assessing the range of possible explanations for 
a particular judge's decision in each of the cases in this study, the 
likelihood that the deciding judge did not fully know or understand the 
law he was applying-the possibility that the deciding judge had not yet 
learned of a recent narrowing or expanding development in the law~an 
43. See discussion infra note 56. 
44. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Faretta catalogues the many questions that make 
a trial judge's job difficult: 
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? 
If so, when must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel 
and the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver 
of each right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right 
to proceed pro se, does he still have a constitutional right to assistance of 
standby counsel? How soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant 
decide between proceeding by counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to 
switch in mid-trial? May a violation of the right to self-representation ever be 
harmless error? Must the trial court treat the pro se defendant differently than 
it would professional counsel? 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975). 
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be dismissed as negligible. In short, Faretta can be regarded as fairly 
consistent precedent, and a constant in this study. 
The Faretta right also had a fairly definite date of birth-the right did 
not exist before the Faretta decision45-which facilitates this kind of 
study by creating a fixed time period and a finite number of cases to 
examine. Therefore "N," regardless of its absolute value, is exhaustive, 
not representative. 
While F aretta is suitable or easy precedent for this study, it is "hard 
precedent" for the judges applying it, or at least somewhat more difficult 
than the precedent governing other constitutional protections afforded the 
accused. Faretta is hard precedent because, while it is seductive to 
uphold a constitutional right that has nothing to do with procedural 
accuracy but instead involves individual dignity, it nonetheless troubles 
even the most staunch supporters of that right to reverse a conviction 
because a defendant had the assistance of counsel, or because his 
apparent desire to represent himself was honored.46 Faretta error does 
not seem to implicate the important policies underlying most of the 
accused's other constitutional procedural protections, such as misconduct 
on the part of the prosecution, or a compromise with the truth-seeking 
goals of the criminal trial process. Faretta-based claims, relative to 
claims involving other constitutional rights of the accused, would seem 
relatively more likely to lead to the exercise of discretion by reviewing 
courts, and relatively more fertile for testing the possible influence of 
ELM factors. 
C. The Tested Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses involving the possible influence of ELM 
factors were posited and are divided into Social Background/Ideology 
and Factual Cues: 
Social Background/Ideology: 
I. Party of Appointing President. Federal judges appointed by 
Republican presidents are as a group more conservative than 
45. Only one state court held the Faretta doctrine to have retroactive application. 
People v. Holcomb, 235 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1975). 
46. As discussed in greater detail infra part 111.D.2.g., these are the two principal 
claims Faretta allows defendants to make. 
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federal judges appointed by Democratic Party presidents. 
Consequently they are more likely to uphold convictions by 
finding no constitutional violation. 
2. Prosecutorial Experience. Notwithstanding the limited findings 
of the social background studies,47 prosecutorial background 
might be relevant to a judge's attitude toward a Faretta-based 
claim. Specifically, judges who once prosecuted criminals would 
be more likely to uphold convictions, and find no constitutional 
violation on the habeas petition, for either of two reasons: (i) 
Because prosecutors are generally more conservative, law-
enforcement minded, and respectful of convictions, or (ii) because 
prosecutors are aware of the tribulations of criminal trial practice 
and might look with disfavor on Faretta-based claims, viewing 
them as mere antics. 
3. Military Experience. Similarly, judges with military experience 
would be more conservative and thus more likely to uphold 
convictions, or to be greater disciplinarians who are less tolerant 
of the pranks Faretta might allow in the courtroom. 
Factual Cues in the Cases: 
4. Counsel on Petition. Drawing on either (i) a basic premise of the 
right to counsel, which is that a criminal defendant is better off 
with representation, or (ii) the finding that the Supreme Court is 
more likely to grant review to paid than to unpaid petitions,48 
which suggests, among other things, that unpaid or pro se equals 
frivolous, it can be posited that a habeas petition is more likely 
to be granted when filed and briefed by counsel than by the 
prisoner appearing pro se. 
5. Seriousness of Crime. The more serious the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted, the more likely the federal district judge 
would rule that there was no constitutional violation. 
6. Posture of Claim. The posture of the Faretta claim may affect 
the outcome. Recall that a defendant could claim either (i) that 
he sought to represent himself but the trial judge denied his 
request, forcing him to go to trial with an attorney, or (ii) that he 
in fact did represent himself but was forced to do so, or otherwise 
invalidly waived counsel. It is fair to hypothesize that trial 
judges will be more sympathetic to the former claim than to the 
47. See, e.g., Ulmer, Social Background, supra note 26; Tate & Handberg, supra 
note 26. 
48. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 199. 
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latter, since the latter more likely seems contrived for appeal 
purposes. Specifically, a defendant making the latter claim 
appears to have gotten exactly what he asked for, so his claim of 
improper waiver would seem to smack of insincerity. 
7. Mental Status. Because of the requirement that waivers of 
counsel be made knowingly and voluntarily, it seems likely that 
cases where the defendant's legal sanity or competency to stand 
trial is at issue should be decided differently than other cases. 49 
Specifically, where the defendant did represent himself, we 
should expect a court to be more likely to find a constitutional 
violation when mental status was at issue than when it was not; 
similarly, where the defendant was denied the right to represent 
himself, a court should be less likely find a constitutional 
violation when his mental status was at issue than when it was 
not, on the theory that a mentally incompetent person should not 
be allowed to represent himself. 
8. Standby Counsel. In many cases where a court permits a 
defendant to represent himself, it also appoints an attorney to act 
as standby or advisory counsel should the defendant require some 
assistance. Faretta permits but does not require this practice.50 
This factor will only exist in cases where the defendant in fact 
represented himself; in those cases, a court should be less likely 
to find a constitutional violation if standby counsel was present 
than if not, on the theory that the defendant had counsel avail-
able--almost the best of both worlds. 
D. Methodology 
1. Sample 
The aim was to obtain all reported federal district court decisions 
resolving Faretta-based claims by state criminal defendants since the 
Faretta decision. To do this, a LEXIS search was performed for all 
federal district court cases that included the terms "Faretta" and 
49. More malleable facts like the defendant's educational background or 
intelligence were not measured; this cue was confined to whether the defendant expressly 
asserted an insanity defense, or whether his competency to stand trial was questioned. 
50. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). 
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"habeas." The search brought up 129 cases; actual inspection eliminated 
19 cases that mentioned those terms but which did not actually involve 
a Faretta based claim, creating a sample of 110. Of the 110, 17 cases 
were not actually habeas petitions but were retained in the sample 
because they were Faretta-based claims by state prisoners. The most 
common examples were Section 1983 claims by state prisoners asserting 
that Faretta required the state to provide a prison library or to improve 
the contents of or access to it so they could effectively exercise their 
Faretta right of self-representation. Two additional cases from the 
sample were eliminated because background data about the deciding 
judge was unavailable. 
The factual cues, or factors, were obtained from the opinions 
themselves.51 Two resources provided the social background and 
biographical information of each judge: The Federal Judiciary 
Almanac52 and the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, 53 both issued 
annually. Each includes a biography for each federal judge serving on 
the bench in a particular year. 
2. Coding the Variables 
The following variables were coded: 
a. The decision in the case (DEC). For most cases, 
this amounted to the simple question whether a constitutional violation 
was found. All decisions are quite clear about this, and coding was as 
follows: 
0 yes ( court found a constitutional viola-
tion) 
1 no ( court found no constitutional viola-
tion) 
For the handful of decisions involving Faretta-based claims in 
nonhabeas contexts such as the prisoners' claim for library books, 
whether the decision expanded or limited the reach and requirements of 
Faretta was coded. So for the DEC variable the following codes were 
assigned: 
2 limits the reach of Faretta (a conservative 
decision) 
51. This does not necessarily create the kind of problem Segal and Spaeth describe 
in their fact pattern analysis. See discussion of this and other possible limitations infra 
text accompanying notes 62-68. 
52. W. STUART DORNETTE & ROBERT R. CROSS, FEDERAL JUDICIARY ALMANAC 
(3d. ed. 1987). 
53. ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Stephen Nelson et. al., eds., 1995). 
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3 expands the reach of Faretta (a liberal 
decision) 
Recall that one of the reasons for including these additional decisions 
was an effort to be exhaustive as to Faretta------to count every possible 
decision involving Faretta from its inception to the date of the study.54 
b. Party of appointing president (PARTY): 
0 Democrat 
1 Republican 
c. Prosecutorial Experience (PROS). Criminal prosecutorial 
experience on the federal, state, or municipal level was encoded as 
"yes." Typical experience was service as an Assistant United States 
Attorney (AUSA), Assistant District Attorney, or County or City 
Prosecutor. Service as an AUSA in only the civil division or service in 
an Attorney General's office was encoded as "no": 
0 yes 
1 no 
d. Military Background (MIL). Active or reserve 




e. Whether the habeas petition (or other prisoner suit) 
was prepared prose or by counsel (COUNSEL): 
0 prose 
1 with counsel 
f. Seriousness of Crime for which Defendant 
Convicted (CRIME). In some cases the defendant was convicted of less 
than the charged offense, but only conviction was encoded: 
0 most serious-death penalty im-
posed 
1 serious (first degree felonies, crimes 
of violence, or prison terms often or 
more years) 
2 less serious (nonviolent, including 
white collar crimes such as securities 
54. The cutoff date for this study was November 4, 1993. As of this writing, a 
handful of additional decisions have been reported. 
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fraud and simple marijuana posses-
sion)55 
g. Posture of Faretta claim (POSTURE). As 
described above, Faretta-based claims can take several forms. The first 
two are the classic postures, squarely presenting the basic Faretta issue; 
but to keep the study exhaustive as to Faretta claims, other claims that 
relied explicitly on Faretta were retained and encoded: 
0 claim that the defendant was improp-
erly allowed to represent himself, 
usually a "bad waiver" or "invalid 
waiver" argument;56 
1 claim that defendant was denied the 
right to represent himself (in whole 
or in part) 
2 a "bad waiver" claim but limited to 
pretrial matters; usually a Miranda-
statements case but in which waiver 
is expressly linked to Faretta 
3 nonhabeas Faretta-based claim, 
usually that the prison should pro-
vide a library or better access to it 
4 miscellaneous Faretta-based claims 
(each a permutation of the self-deter-
mination principle, such as the right 
to testify or control strategy in the 
presence of counsel or even to con-
trol choice of counsel) 
h. Mental Status (SANITY). Whether the defendant's 
mental status was raised: 
0 yes 
1 no 
i. Presence of Standby Counsel (STANDBY). If 
POSTURE = 0 (the claim is that the defendant was wrongly allowed to 
55. Incarceration is a requirement for habeas, so even these less serious crimes 
involved jail sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). 
56. This category includes cases where the claim relates either to the entirety of 
the proceedings or to only a portion. For example, in some death cases, the defendant 
did not waive counsel until the sentencing phase. In another, the defendant dismissed 
his attorney before closing argument and delivered the closing himself. In still others, 
the defendant waived counsel and then pleaded guilty, so his claim is limited to wrongful 
self-representation at that plea appearance. 
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E. The Tests and Resulting Data 
1. Set 1: Social Background and Ideology 
A series of tests for correlations was performed to search for any 
quantitative basis for the relations posited in the hypotheses set forth 
above.57 For the first set of tests, all the cases were used (including the 
seventeen involving Faretta that were not pure habeas petitions), so N 
= 108. Again, one of the goals was to be exhaustive as to Faretta, so 
to run this first set of tests the first variable (DEC) was recoded to create 
a second variable called "DEC2." To create DEC2 each "2" (decisions 
limiting the reach of F aretta) was converted to "l" ( decisions finding no 
57. The statistical assistance of Jeffrey Segal is gratefully acknowledged. While 
I prefer to spare law readers the technicalities of the Spaeth and Segal program, a few 
terms used throughout my discussion must be explained. For further discussion of 
statistical methods, see HUBERT M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (1979). 
In this study, two of the figures generated in each set of data are relevant to the 
statistical significance. Generally, results are considered statistically significant if the 
Pearson indicator is below 0.05. Pearson chi squared is a test of statistical significance 
that tells how likely it is that the observed results could have happened by chance if 
there were no relationship between the variables. As a rule of thumb, significance levels 
below 0.05 are considered acceptable. 
The reliability of results is also indicated by the size of gamma. Gamma (y) is a 
proportionate reduction in error statistic that ranges from negative one (- l) to positive 
one ( l ). A gamma of O indicates that one is not able to improve on predicting the 
dependent variable (court decisions) by knowing the value of the independent variable 
(party, etc.). Gammas of -1 or I mean that one can perfectly predict the dependent 
variable from the independent variable (this never occurs). A gamma of 0.50 means that 
one can reduce the error rate in predicting the dependent variable by 50% by knowing 
the value of the independent variable. The sign of gamma means simply whether high 
values on the two variables are positively or negatively associated. Generally, results 
are more reliable the stronger the value of gamma. For example, gamma of 0.1 is less 
significant than gamma of 0.4. Negative gammas are highly insignificant. 
Finally, the technique of crosstabulation was used in this study to assess the 
relationship between the vari~bles. Crosstabulation is probably the most common 
technique for assessing the relationship between two nominal or ordinal variable levels. 
See generally BLALOCK, supra. 
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constitutional violation) and each "3" (decisions expanding Faretta) was 
converted to "O" (decisions finding a constitutional violation). 
The results of DEC2 by PARTY, DEC2 by PROS and DEC2 by MIL 
are found in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively, located in the appendix.58 
None of the results is statistically significant (Pearson measures of 
significance are 0.57, 0.82, and 0.29, respectively, and gammas are all 
negative). Nor are there any discernible trends involving the first two 
factors, Appointing President's Party (Table 1) and Prosecutorial 
Background (Table 2). Republican and Democrat appointees on the 
federal district court appear to rule favorably on Faretta-based claims at 
approximately the same rate; indeed, counter to expectations, the 
Republican rate of 39.3% actually exceeds the Democrat rate of 34.0%. 
Similarly, federal district judges with prosecutorial experience appear to 
rule favorably at approximately the same rate as those lacking prosecuto-
rial experience. 
Interestingly, military background (Table 3) probably has some role 
in the decisions. First, while a Pearson measure of 0.29 makes the 
results formally insignificant by professional statistician's standards, at 
0.29 it is still markedly lower than the significance measures of the other 
two tests. Second, by an almost ten-percentage-point variation, judges 
with military experience rejected Faretta-based claims more often than 
those without it (67.2% as opposed to 57.4%), consistent with expecta-
tions. At a minimum, military background appears to be more related 
to decisional outcome than either prosecutorial background or the 
appointing president's political ideology. 
2. Set 2: Limiting the Sample to "Classic" Claims 
For the next set of tests the sample was reduced to habeas petitions 
(where DEC= 0 or 1) involving one of the two "classic" Faretta claims 
(POSTURE= 0 or 1). For this group, N = 82. DEC (so limited) was 
crosstabbed with PARTY, PROS, and MIL; the results (Tables 4, 5, and 
6) are almost indistinguishable from the first set of results (Tables 1, 2, 
and 3, for DEC2, where N was 108). 
With this same refined sample (N = 82) DEC was crosstabbed with 
CRIME. Again, the results are not significant (Pearson exceeds 0.8 and 
gamma is negative) but a trend is visible: Death penalty cases appear 
to be treated somewhat differently. Consistent with one of the initial 
hypotheses, district judges granted only 25% of the Faretta-based 
petitions of death row inmates as opposed to 34% and 35%, respectively, 
58. The tables are compiled in the appendix to avoid distracting the reader. 
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of the petitions of persons convicted for the other two categories of 
crimes (Table 7, row 1). 
3. Set 3: Tests Based on POSTURE 
The next set of tests focused on the POSTURE factor. Keeping the 
same refined and reduced N of 82 (where DEC = 0 or 1 and POSTURE 
= 0 or 1), DEC was crosstabbed by POSTURE. The resulting data is 
insignificant (significance in excess of 0.58 and gamma negative)(Table 
8). Nor were the raw numbers material, though courts appear to respond 
slightly more favorably to claims that the defendant was denied the right 
to represent himself (POSTURE = 1) than to claims that the defendant 
was wrongly allowed to represent himself (granting 36.4% of the former 
as opposed to 30.6% of the latter). 
a. Set 3A: POSTURE= 0. 
Tests were then run for each of the two postures separately, and 
noticeably more significant ( or less statistically insignificant) results than 
in the previous rounds were obtained. First, N was further narrowed 
from 82 (where DEC= 0 or 1 and POSTURE= 0 or 1) to only those 
cases in which POSTURE = 0, where the petitioner claimed he was 
wrongly allowed to represent himself. For those cases, DEC was 
crosstabbed by CRIME, by PARTY, by PROS, by MIL, by COUNSEL, 
by SANITY, and by STANDBY. The results are all statistically 
insignificant (Tables 9 through 15) but a few are nonetheless notable. 
First, Table 9 shows that the difference attributable to the level of 
crime is even more pronounced than in Table 7 (where N was 82 and 
included claims that the defendant had been denied the right to represent 
himself). To be sure, this is partly explained by the fact that there are 
fewer death penalty cases in this sample than in the first set of tests (7 
cases as opposed to 12); nonetheless, only one "bad waiver" claim 
received a favorable ruling. 
The second noteworthy result involves PARTY (Table 10). 
Democratic appointees are strikingly less likely than Republican 
appointees (19.0% as opposed to 39.3%) to rule favorably on "bad-
waiver" claims. This seems especially notable in light of the findings 
in Tables 1 and 4, which showed virtually no difference in overall 
decisions based on party. Furthermore, the Pearson significance 
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indicator, 0.12, is the lowest in the entire project (gamma, however, is 
still negative). 
As for the other social background factors, DEC by PROS (Table 11) 
and DEC by MIL (Table 12) show no significant results and no notable 
trend. Military background correlates with a slightly higher favorable 
ruling rate, consistent with the statistically insignificant trends identified 
in Tables 3 and 6. 
Representation by counsel (column 2 on Table 13) on the petition 
slightly increases the chances of a favorable ruling (35.5% of such 
petitions granted, as opposed to 22.2 % of the pro se petitions), which 
seems to be an intuitive result---presumably, counsel's assistance helps. 
The findings on the role of the defendant's sanity are statistically 
insignificant and show no notable trend (see Table 14). Finally, the 
appointment of standby counsel correlates with a slightly lower favorable 
ruling rate, an intuitive finding, but again the data are highly insignifi-
cant (Table 15). 
b. Set 3B: POSTURE = I 
The next set of tests were run on only those cases where the 
prisoner claimed that he had sought to represent himself at trial and was 
denied that right (POSTURE = 1 ). This sample contained only 33 cases 
(N = 33). Six of the seven tests run in Set 3A were performed here 
(DEC by CRIME, by PARTY, by PROS, by MIL, by COUNSEL, and 
by SANITY). DEC by STANDBY was not run, however, because the 
presence of standby counsel is not applicable; the nature of POSTURE 
= 1 is that the defendant was represented by counsel. Again, although 
N was only 33, and each of the resulting data sets is statistically 
insignificant (Tables 16 through 21), several are notably less so 
(PARTY, COUNSEL, and SANITY show sizeable variation and have 
significance levels of 0.16, 0.14, and 0.25, respectively). The results 
also take on greater meaning when compared with the results of Set 3A 
(where POSTURE = 0, a claim that the defendant was improperly 
allowed to represent himself). 59 
59. The results for DEC by CRIME (Table 16) and DEC by PROS (Table 18) in 
this sample are insignificant. Furthermore, DEC by CRIME shows that death penalty 
cases where POSTURE = I are actually treated more favorably than other serious crimes 
and less favorably than nonserious crimes, and also much more favorably than death 
penalty cases where POSTURE = 0 (40% as opposed to 14.3% granted, see Table 9). 
One explanation, of course, is that the problem of the small sample (N = 33) is worsened 
when there are three categories instead of two, and that may partly explain this result. 
It may also be the case, however, that while posture does not matter overall (see Table 
8), when death is involved it does, and the difference according to these two tables 
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The results of DEC by PARTY (Table 17) in this sample are perhaps 
the most significant in the project: The significance indicator is low and 
gamma is positive and moderate (0.47). The results show that when the 
petition claims that the defendant was denied the right to represent 
himself, Democratic appointees are twice as likely as Republican 
appointees to find a Faretta violation. On one level this is what was 
predicted----that Democrats would be more liberal generally and more 
likely to find a constitutional violation-----but coupled with Table 10, it 
shows a more specific party-ideology link, and one that is not intuitive, 
although not necessarily counterintuitive: Democratic appointees are 
more likely to overturn a conviction where a defendant had a lawyer 
than where he went it alone. This seems atypical of the traits commonly 
attributed to Democratic party ideology, such as paternalism, protection-
ism, and government activism. Some of the limits discussed below60 
or other factors not tested might account for this striking difference. 
Also notable are the results in DEC by COUNSEL (Table 20), both 
alone and when compared with the results for the same test when 
POSTURE = 0 (Table 13). With a relatively low Pearson significance 
indicator (0.124) and a positive and moderate gamma (0. 52), Table 20 
shows that pro se petitions are almost twice as likely to be granted as are 
petitions prepared by attorneys. This is at first blush counterintuitive, 
counter to the initial hypothesis, and contrary to the apparent effect of 
counsel in the other-postured cases. One possible explanation, however, 
is that when a prisoner claims that he was denied the right to represent 
himself at trial, he perhaps bolsters the overall credibility of that claim 
if he behaves consistently by also representing himself on habeas. 
The results of DEC by SANITY (Table 21) also present a curious 
result. With a Pearson significance indicator of 0.25 (again, while not 
low, it is relatively low for this project) and a moderate-to-strong gamma 
(0.6), Table 21 shows that a question concerning the defendant's sanity 
correlates with a granting of the petition more than twice as often as 
when there is no question of the defendant's sanity. Because this reflects 
(accepting their statistical insignificance) is that courts are more willing to tolerate a 
defendant going to his death under his own banner (that is, rejecting more claims under 
POSTURE = 0) than when his liberty to engineer his own destiny was restrained. This 
is not intuitive, however, which suggests that the other explanation is more likely. 
DEC by PROS, to the extent it shows a trend, is consistent with the tests on the larger 
samples. 
60. See discussion infra part III.B. 
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only POSTURE = 1 cases, however, this suggests the completely 
counterintuitive notion that a trial court's forcing of an attorney on a 
defendant is more likely ruled unconstitutional when the defendant's 
mental status is questioned than when it is not questioned. Despite the 
relatively strong (for this study) significance indicators, perhaps one or 
more of the various limitations discussed below (in particular, the very 
small sample size: N was only 33 for Set 3B) account for this curious 
result.61 
4. Set 4: CRIME tests 
The final test focused on the CRIME factor. To better examine the 
possible importance of the death penalty as a cue, CRIME was recoded 
as follows: 
Death penalty cases = 0 
All other cases = 1 
Controlling separately for POSTURE = 0 and then for POSTURE = 
1, CRIME was then crosstabbed with DEC. The results are insignificant 
(Tables 22 and 23). 
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. General Implications 
To be sure, given the high Pearson indicators throughout, most of the 
inferences sought to be drawn in the above analysis are strained. Indeed, 
for some variations attributable to the different posture in which the 
claim is brought, no statistically significant results were found. The least 
statistically insignificant results are counterintuitive, especially the 
favoritism judges appointed by Democratic presidents appear to show for 
claims that the defendant was denied the right to represent himself--a 
favoritism relative both to the way Democratic-appointed judges rule on 
other postured claims ( claims that the defendant was wrongly allowed 
to represent himself) and to the less favorable reactions of Republican-
appointed judges to similar claims (Tables 10 and 17). There are some 
trends in the insignificant numbers, such as a fairly consistent indication 
of a link between favorable Faretta decisions and military service by the 
61. The SANITY tests in general seem flawed: Table 14, which shows the result 
of DEC by SANITY for the other postured sample, shows that the presence of questions 
about the defendant's sanity has virtually no effect, or a slightly opposite effect, in those 
cases. That slightly opposite effect, suggesting a slight preference for self-representation 
by persons of questionable mental status than by others, is equally counterintuitive. 
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deciding judge (Tables 3, 6, and 12, for example). Similarly, although 
statistically insignificant, there are fairly consistent indicators that death 
penalty cases are treated differently: Overall, they seem to be ruled on 
less favorably than other cases, unless the claim is that the defendant 
was denied the right to represent himself--the paradigmatic Faretta 
claim. In short, none of the posited hypotheses of ELM influence was 
proven, though some were supported with strained readings of the 
results. 
B. Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation of this study is sample size: Arguably it is too 
small. Certainly, some of the sample sizes used by Segal and Spaeth are 
in the thousands of cases, but their fact-pattern analysis of Supreme 
Court search and seizure cases had an N of 196.62 The N of 108 in 
this study is not drastically out of that range. Indeed its virtue, if any, 
is that it represented exhaustive coverage of an issue. To be sure, the 
samples in Sets 3A and 3B were only 49 and 33, respectively; curiously, 
the best significance measures came from tests of those samples. 
Perhaps a future study could test a larger group of cases, such as the 
Faretta-based decisions of the federal appellate courts,63 or could select 
a slightly broader category of cases, such as those involving effective 
assistance of counsel claims generally, rather than merely Faretta-based 
claims. 
Another possible limitation in the eyes of social science's standards is 
that the factors were obtained from the opinions themselves. This 
methodology, however does not pose the kind of problem that Segal and 
Spaeth warn against. As they explain, certain data in the opinions are 
likely to be tainted by virtue of their appearance there at the hand of the 
judge whose response to that cue is being studied. Moreover, many of 
the facts Segal and Spaeth use in their study are closer to legal facts, at 
great risk of being influenced by--even excluded by--the result the 
authoring judge desires to reach.64 The facts in this study, by contrast, 
62. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 208-21. 
63. A LEXIS search of federal appellate decisions for cases mentioning "Faretta" 
and "habeas" generated a list of over 200 such cases. 
64. For example, whether there was probable cause is one of the legal facts Segal 
and Spaeth measure. It is easy to see how the court's own characterization of this 
fact-which is more like a legal conclusion--would be influenced by the overall result 
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are not as susceptible to taint by bias. One of this study's 
cues--whether the prisoner was represented by counsel on the peti-
tion-is not reported by the court at all but by the reporting service. 
The others--the posture in which the claim is raised, what crime the 
defendant was convicted of, and whether standby counsel was appoint-
ed-are not malleable facts. The potential for a problem with the final 
factor, SANITY, did not materialize since what was measured was not 
whether the defendant was in fact insane or incompetent (arguably a 
court's presentation of this fact would be influenced by its desired 
ultimate result in the case) but merely whether the defendant's sanity 
was put in issue.65 
Another set of limitations relates to the social background and 
ideology tests. Concededly, the party of an appointing president is a 
only a rough estimate of ideology, and one might well undertake to 
examine, as did Segal and Spaeth, media reports about each judge at the 
time of his or her appointment. Even after accepting the value of 
looking at the appointing president's party, there could still be refine-
ments. For example, one might code more specifically, perhaps 
accounting for whether the appointing president was ideologically 
conscious or overtly politically motivated in his appointments,66 or for 
whether the Democrat-appointed judge was a Southerner.67 Other 
idiosyncracies, geographic and otherwise, might need to be accounted 
for. For example, many states do not have the death penalty, so because 
of habeas jurisdiction rules a federal judge in New York almost never 
hears a death penalty habeas petition,68 whereas her brethren in Texas 
hear many such petitions. A future study might focus on such matters. 
Furthermore, three of the judges included in the study decided more than 
one case, and no Clinton appointees had written a decision on a Faretta-
based habeas petition at the time the data for this study was gathered. 
in the case. The "facts" in this study, by contrast, are not comparably collapsible into 
the ultimate legal issue. 
65. Of course there remains the possibility that competency could have been raised 
in the trial court but not mentioned by the federal judge, but nearly all opinions include 
summaries of the procedural history, essential for the exhaustion part of the discussion 
of any habeas opinion, so they are fairly reliable sources for listing the issues raised at 
each stage of the litigation process. 
66. Tate and Handberg considered this attribute. See Tate & Handberg, supra note 
26. 
67. Id. 
68. Habeas jurisdiction lies wherever the defendant's conviction was obtained or 
where he is incarcerated. See supra note 34. At the time this study was performed, 
New York had not yet enacted its death penalty statute. 
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C. Conclusion: Broader Implications of the Study 
The overall insignificance, by statisticians' standards, of the many 
correlations does not make this study nonsignificant. To the contrary, 
the consistency and high degree of the statistical insignificance signal 
this study's ramifications: Finding virtually no support for any of the 
initial hypotheses, this study tends to confirm Segal and Spaeth's 
hypothesis that attitudinal factors do not measurably influence decisions 
on the lower courts, at least not nearly to the degree that they affect 
Supreme Court deliberations. To be sure, this study is not dispositive 
affirmative proof that ELM factors have no role on the federal district 
court bench. Nonetheless, given (1) the invitation to the exercise of 
judicial discretion that Faretta-based claims implicitly seem to offer, (2) 
the absence of statistically significant findings for any of the ELM 
factors, and (3) the evidentiary challenge whenever absence is sought to 
be established, the results are probative. They are consistent with the 
assertion that, on the district court level, when cases are decided in 
chambers and in writing, and when the parties invoke precedent, the 
legal model is alive and well.69 The legal model as Segal and Spaeth 
define it has not been, and perhaps cannot be, directly proven; the best 
evidence of its existence or vigor may be indirect, through the elimina-
tion of as many ELM factors as one can sensibly identify. This study 
could be regarded as the beginning of that process. 
69. This conclusion excludes many of the other kinds of decisions or rulings that 
district court judges make day to day, and which are unique to their level of the bench, 
such as evidentiary rulings in trials, judgments issued from the bench on orally argued 
motions, and many sentencing decisions, to name a few. 
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Tab le 10 
PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT (in Cases .t 
In Which Defendant Claimed He Was 
"Wrongly" Allowed to Represent Himself) . ' 
C Count Democrat (0) Republican ( I ) Row 
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Table 12 
MILITARY BACKGROUND (in Cases 
II In Which Defendant Claimed He Was 
"Wrongly" Allowed to Represent Himself) 
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Table 14 
WHETHER ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S SANIT"Y; RAISED 
(in Cases In Which Defendant Claimed He Was 
"Wrongly" Allowed Lo Represent Himself) ·1 
C Count Issue Issue Not Row 
0 Col Pct Raised Raised Total 
u (0) ( I ) 
R 
T 
Fareua vi olati on II 15 
I) found (0) 28.6 31.4 30.6 
E . 
C No vio lation fo und IO 24 34 
I ( I ) 71.4 68.6 69.4 s 
I 
0 Column 14 35 49 
N Total 28.6 71.4 100.0 
-
Chi -Sguare ~ ..QE_ Significance 
Pearson .03843 .84458 
Continuity Correcti on .00000 1.00000 
Like lihood Rati o .0387 .84398 
Mante l-Haenszel tes t .03765 .8461 5 
fo r linear associati on 
Minimum Expected Freq uency: 4.286 
Stati tic ~ ASE i Val/ASEO 
Gamma -.06796 .34573 -.19835 
Number of Mis. ing Observatio ns: 0 
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Table 15 
WHETHER "STANDBY" COUNSEL APPOINI'ED 
(in Cases In Which Defendant Claimed He Was 
Wrongly Allowed to Represent Himself) 
·c Count Yes (0) No t i ) Row 
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No violati on fo und 18 16 34 
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I 
O " I Column 25 24 49 
N Total 51.0 49.0 100.0 
-· ~ 
Chi-Sguare Value J2f... Si!!ni ficance 
Pearson .1 6397 .68552 
Continuity Correcti on .0090 1 .92439 
Likelihood Ratio . 16402 .68548 
Mantel-Haenszel test . 16063 .68858 
fo r linear association 
Minimum Expected Frequency: 7.347 
Statistic Value AS E i Val/ASEO 
Gamma -.12500 .30576 -.40521 
Number of Miss ing Observations: 0 
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Table 16 
SERIOUSNESS OF DEFENDANT'S CRIME (in C:ases·: '" -:)~?~ _'.!J/:- , 
In Which Defendant Claimed His Request to · -:-,,, ........ ... ~-\ ..... 
. _: • .;.,l,":";'.l,.~ 
Represent Himself Was Wrongly Denied) . • r,· .. :~ltr-:~· 
C Count Death Serious: l 0 Less Row 
0 Col Pct Penalt y felo ny. violen t Serious Total 
u Imposed ( I) (2) 
R (0) 
T 
Farefla vio lat ion 2 7 3 12 
D found (0) 40.0 31.8 50.0 36.4 
E 
C No vio lati on 3 15 3 2 1 
I fo und ( I ) 60.0 68.2 50.0 63.6 s 
I 
0 Column 5 22 6 33 
N Total 15.2 66.7 18.2 100.0 
C hi •Square Value J2£.. Si~nificance 
Pearson .70714 2 .70218 
Likelihood Ratio .69229 2 .7074 1 
Mantel Haensze l tes t . 15470 .69409 
for linear assoc iati on 
Minimum Expected Freq uency: 1.8 18 
Statistic Va lue ASE i V;li/ASEO 
Gamma -.13636 .34762 -.38922 




PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT'{i 
In Which Defendant Claimed His 
Represent Himself Was Wrongly 
Democrat (0) Republican ( I) 
7 5 
50.0 26.3 
No vio lation found 7 14 
( I ) 50.0 73.7 
14 19 
42.4 57.6 
Chi-Sguare Value DF Significance 
Pearson 1.95395 .16216 
Continuity Correction 1.06448 .30220 
Likelihood Ratio 1.95298 . 16227 
Mante l-Haenszel test 1.89474 .16867 
for linear assoc iation 
Minimum Expected Frequency : 5.091 
Statistic Value ASEi Val/ASEO 
Gamma .47368 .28947 1.40981 
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Table 18 
PROSECUTORIAL EXPERIENCE (in Casps 
In Which Defendant Claimed His Request, ,;. 
to Represent Himself Was Wrongly Denied) ~ 





















Gamma -.10345 .37571 

























MILITARY BACKGROUND (in 
In Which Defendant Claimed His 










fou nd (0) 
E • 
c ·. ' -
I _- -
s 
No violation fo und 









Likelihood Rati o 
Mantel -Haenszel test 














Minimum Expected Frequency: 5.8 18 
Statistic Va lue 
(0) 
Gamma -.30233 .33301 
Number of Missing Observati ons : 0 
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Table 20 
WHETHER PETITION/SUIT RAISING FARErn 
WAS PREPARED PRO SE OR WITH COUNSBC 
In Which Defendant Claimed His Req 

















fo und (0) 
No violation found 





Con tinuity Correcti o n 
Like lihood Rati o 
Mantel -Hae nszel test 























































WHETIIER ISSUE OF DEfENDANT'S SAN RAISED. . ._ 
(in Ca~es In Which Defendant Claimed He Was 
"Wrongly" Allowed to Represent HimseU) · 
Iss ue Issue Not 
Raised Raised 
(0) ( I ) 
2 10 
66.7 33.3 
No violation found I 20 
( I ) 33.3 66.7 
30 
9.1 90.9 
Chi -Sguare Value __Qf_ Significance 
Pearson l.30952 .25248 
Continu ity Correction .2651 8 .60658 
Likelihood Ratio 1.25186 .26320 
Mantel-Haenszel tes t 1.26984 .25980 
for linear assoc iation 
Minimum Expected Frequency: 1.09 1 
Statistic Value Val/ASEO 
Gamma .60000 .41105 1.01078 
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Table 22 
WHETIIER DEA 111 PENAL TY IMPOSED.-(i 
In Which Defendant Claimed He Was 
Wrongly Allowed to Represent Himself) 
C Count Death As 




Faretta violation I 
D found (0) 14.3 
E 
C No violation found 6 
I ( I ) 85.7 s 
I 
0 Column 7 
N Total 14.3 
Chi-Sguare Va lue _Qf_ 
Pearson 1.02484 
Continuity Correction .32426 
Likelihood Ratio 1.15555 
Mante l-Haenszel test 1.00392 
for linear association 
Minimum Expected Freq uency: 2. 143 
Stati stic Value 
Gamma -.50000 .42324 
Numher o r Missi ng Observati ons : 0 
All Other 
Cases ( I) 
14 
33.3 
28 
66.7 
42 
85.7 
Significance 
.31137 
.56906 
.28239 
.3 1636 
Val/A EO 
-1.18427 
Row 
Total 
15 
30.6 
34 
69.4 
49 
100.0 
753 
